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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
IN 1989: REVISIONS OR A PAUSE*
Josef Rohlik**
This is the second time I have participated in the Roundtable on
Employment Law organized by Professor Vogel-Polsky at the Insti-
tute. Needless to say, I am very honored by your kind invitation,
and very pleased to be here. Since everybody here is well acquainted
with the "law of employment discrimination" in the United States,
I will limit my remarks to a few very recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States which have generated some controversy,
and indeed, some fear that the era of continuous expansion in the
civil rights area may be ending.'
The decisions here under consideration were issued this year, in
1989, the year in which we celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of the Act provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... 2
This proposition, when read in isolation, sounds simple enough.
Discrimination on account of the suspect classifications is prohibited.
Discrimination, it might appear, is a factual matter, e.g., unequal
* A paper presented at the Roundtable on Unlawful Discrimination in Em-
ployment at the Institute of European Studies in Brussels in July, 1989.
* Professor of Law at St. Louis University School of Law.
E.g., The New York Times on June 13, 1989 published commentaries on some
of the recent decisions under the subtitles "Shift to Right Seen" and "Ruling Called
Setback to Blacks and Women in Affirmative Action." The article states:
The actions [of the Court] showed that former President Ronald Reagan
has largely accomplished his goal of creating a conservative Supreme Court
majority willing to reverse the Court's direction on civil rights . . . 'The
Supreme Court is dealing blow after blow to 25 years of progress in civil
rights law,' said Representative Don Edwards, the California Democrat who
heads the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights.
N.Y. Times, June 13, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981).
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pay of men and women for equal work. It must be proven, and if
so proven it violates the Act. When one considers that, as a practical
matter, the beginning of the end of racial segregation in the United
States came only in 1954,1 a fact-sensitive approach to discrimination
cases may have been practical in the early stages of the development
of law under Title VII.
As we all know, courts in the United States are to a certain extent-
and within the limits of political prudence-lawmaking bodies. In
the constitutional arena, the Supreme Court of the United States,
and to a lesser extent lower courts, "construe ' 4 our living Consti-
tution, in that the Court is constantly adapting the 18th century
constitutional text to modern society and conditions. This constitu-
tional role of the Court has served the United States extraordinarily
well, particularly if one compares the evolutionary constitutional
continuity in the United States with wide swings of legal and political
regimes in a number of civil law countries in the last two hundred
years. The role of the courts in the civil rights area has been what
a Yale law professor, Owen Fiss, has characterized as bringing "a
recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals." 5 Fiss' proposition is
a broad one, related to his view of the role of the courts as organs
of state interventionism, and as such has a heavy ideological bent.
Yet, in the employment discrimination area, it cannot be doubted
that the American society has accepted that, in the abstract, discrim-
ination on account of suspect classifications is reprehensible.
American industry has quickly adapted to the idea that discrimi-
nation is not only prohibited, but also that it is very expensive. As
is well known, American corporations of any substance are constantly
seeking and receiving legal advice. They have special departments
such as Human Resources departments and Affirmative Action of-
ficers which constantly deal with legal and contractual employment
matters. Cases of overt employment discrimination which would lend
themselves to relatively easy proof by plaintiffs at some point in time
between 1964 and today receded into the background when compared
with various subtle forms of discrimination, and, in particular, with
a goal of a truly systemic change: race, gender, etc. must not only
be irrelevant to employment decisions, but also members of these
I Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4 The term construction, as a creative process, is often contrasted with "mere"
interpretation.
I Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984).
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suspect classifications must have a special and, perhaps, accelerated
opportunity to become integrated in management, professions, and
the work force in general at all levels. The goal became a homog-
enization of the work force in the context of pervasive past discrim-
ination, and in the context of psychological vestiges of the bygone
era of pronounced and then acceptable intolerance. To achieve this
goal, members of the suspect classifications, or "minorities," ' 6 re-
ceived, through judicial decisions, somewhat favored treatment de-
signed to remedy the effects of past discrimination. Very roughly
there have been two categories of devices to achieve the goal: affir-
mative action and various legal devices such as inferences or pres-
umptions inherent in e.g. mixed motive or disparate impact cases.
In my judgment, which is probably not very controversial on this
point, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have dealt
with the facts of individual employment discrimination cases with a
very broad "brush" to fashion goal oriented and conduct rules. In
a robust and uniquely American way, the courts, through findings
of liability and through new rules and dicta, have been sending a
clear message to American employers: you ingenious capitalist en-
terprises, make sure that you work toward the inclusion of minorities
in your work force, and make sure that you constantly instill in your
work force the new, modern thinking concerning minorities; invent
a way to hire minorities and teach them the necessary skills if they
do not have them; we do not care how you do it, but do it. A part
of the message has been, until 1989, a certain psychology which
Supreme Court decisions have to some extent justified: if an em-
ployment discrimination case reaches the Supreme Court, there is a
significant likelihood that the plaintiff will win.
When one deals with a goal oriented jurisprudence, even tangible
progress rarely makes the goal less elusive. In the 1970's, the questions
asked were, for example, how many lawyers or accountants are blacks
or women, 7 how many blacks or women are in the managerial po-
sitions with corporations? Today, there are additional questions: how
many blacks or women are partners in professional partnerships, how
I The term "minority" sometimes loses linguistic meaning and becomes descrip-
tive of a favored group. For example, women, who form a majority of the U.S.
population, are referred to as a minority for purposes such as affirmative action.
Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1770 and n.17 (1973).
7 Today, roughly a third of the associates of large law firms are women. See
Judith Kay, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward Gender
Equality, 57 FoRDHAM L. REv. 111, 119, n.47 (1988).
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many blacks or women are members of corporate boards? Yet, tan-
gible results of remedies for past discrimination are likely to create
reactions, including adverse reactions. There is a notion of "reverse
discrimination," ' discrimination against one traditionally considered
a member of the majority. In my judgment, an almost necessary
tension has arisen in modern liberal democracy: individualism which,
as the current self-destruction of communism appears to indicate, is
inherent in man versus the goal of social justice and welfare for all.
It seems to me that it is inherent in evolutionary process that there
be pauses and balancing acts.
The Supreme Court decisions addressed here, as well as other recent
Supreme Court decisions, changed the psychology, the expectations
in the employment discrimination area. In my judgment, these de-
cisions somehow "lowered" Title VII cases from the "policy level"
to an "ordinary legal level": for instance, with respect to the quantum
of the defendant's proof in mixed motive cases or to collateral attacks
on consent decrees. Also, it appears that these cases, particularly
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins9 and Wards Cove Packing Company,
Inc. v. Atonio,'0 suggest greater attention to the actual facts of each
case, more decision-making and less lawmaking. However, while the
Justices of the Supreme Court themselves are in disagreement whether
these decisions accomplished changes in law of any significance, these
decisions do not detract from the sophisticated system of employment
discrimination law which continues to benefit members of the suspect
classifications, and which, I think, does not have a parallel in the
contemporary Europe.
On May 1, 1989, the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins." Hopkins, the plaintiff, was a senior manager in Price
Waterhouse, which is a giant national accounting firm with offices
throughout the United States. In 1982, she was proposed for part-
nership, but the decision was to hold her candidacy for one year,
which was the employer's action before the Court.12 "Of the 622
partners at the firm at that time, 7 were women. Of 88 persons
proposed for partnership that year, only 1-Hopkins-was a
I See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 413
(1978).
9 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
10 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
" 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
12 Ms. Hopkins was later constructively discharged by denial of partnership. Id.
at 1781 n.1.
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woman."' 3 She "played a key role' ' '4 in winning a 25 million dollar
contract with the U.S. Government, functioning "virtually at the
partner level."' 5 She was aggressive but respected by clients who
considered her "extremely competent [and] intelligent." 1 6 However,
she was "overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and
impatient with staff.' 1 7 Her problems with subordinates in the office
"doomed her bid for partnership"' 8 in the firm's eyes. The trial
court found those problems to be real. However, she was also a
subject of sexual stereotyping. She was told to take "a course at
charm school" and was described as "macho."' 9 She was criticized
for her use of profanities, and when advised of the firm's decision
to put her candidacy on hold, she was told that she should "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
makeup, have her hair styled and wear jewelry.''20
Obviously, looking like a lady and behaving like a lady is not a
"bona fide occupational qualification" for a manager who proved
herself extremely successful with clients. The finding of sexual ster-
eotyping and of interpersonal problems make this a "mixed motive
case," one of both illegitimate and legitimate motives. If the employer
took the adverse employment action without reliance on the illegit-
imate cause, he did not violate the act. It is readily apparent that
the rules on distribution of burden of proof, the type and quantum
of evidence, may come close to being outcome determinative in
difficult cases. There is no question that the plaintiff must prove that
the employer relied upon prohibited consideration in reaching a de-
cision adverse to the employee. In the Hopkins case, this is easy to
do. The testimony of the partners who evaluated Hopkins will suffice.
The question presented is who has the burden to show what would
have happened to Hopkins had Price Waterhouse not taken gender
into account.
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion was written by Justice Bren-
nan and joined in by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
According to the plurality, once the plaintiff proves that "the em-
,3 Id. at 1781.
14 Id. at 1782.
i5 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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ployer relied upon sex based considerations"' the burden shifts to
the employer to prove that "even if it had not taken gender into
account, it would have come to the same decision regarding a par-
ticular person. ' 22 For the plurality, "the employer's burden is most
appropriately deemed an affirmative defense.' '23 The employer "should
be able to present some objective evidence . . . [and] must show that
its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make
the same decision." '2
4
Justice Kennedy, the author of the dissenting opinion of which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined, rejects the burden
shifting approach, and interprets the statute and prior decisions of
the court as requiring the plaintiff prove "but-for" causation, that
the prohibited motive was the cause of the adverse action. 25
The decision of the Court is in fact defined by concurring opinions
of Justices White and O'Connor. According to Justice O'Connor,
shifting the burden of proof as per the plurality view should be
limited "for use in cases such as this one, where the employer has
created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial
weight to an impermissible criterion. 2 6 Justice White agreed and
rejected the proposition of objective contemporaneous evidence: If
"the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been taken
for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof." 27 Justice
Kennedy interprets the actual holding in Hopkins as follows:
I read the opinions as establishing that in a limited number of cases
Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substantial evidence of
discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant to show that an adverse employment decision would have
been supported by legitimate reasons. The shift in the burden of
persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff proves by direct evidence
that an unlawful motive was a substantial factor actually relied upon
in making a decision.... [T]he evidentiary scheme created today
is not for every case in which a plaintiff produces evidence of stray
remarks in the workplace .... Where the plaintiff makes the req-
uisite showing, the burden that shifts to the employer is to show
21 Id. at 1786.
2 Id.
23 Id. at 1788.
14 Id. at 1791-92.
23 Id. at 1808-09.
26 Id. at 1796.
27 Id.
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that legitimate employment considerations would have justified the
decision without reference to any impermissible motive. . . . The
employer's proof on the point is to be presented and reviewed just
as with any other evidentiary question .... 21
The Court held that the employer must make his showing by a
preponderance of the evidence under "conventional rules of civil
litigation" 29 rather than by clear and convincing evidence as the courts
below deemed appropriate.
The Hopkins decision demonstrates the pitfalls for plaintiffs in
mixed motive cases, which are more typical today than the relatively
simple pretextual cases. The greater the preoccupation with technical
legal dogmatics, the more difficult it is for the lower courts to resort
to a functional analysis promoting the broad purposes of Title VII.
The Hopkins decision is a balancing act between the interests of the
plaintiff and the traditional rights of the employer, in which the
Court takes a less overtly activist role than it formerly did.
The Court decided a disparate impact case, Wards Cove Packing
Company, Inc. v. Atonio ° on June 5, 1989. The opinion of the
Court was delivered by Justice White and joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy.
The plaintiffs-respondents, a class of non-white cannery workers,
brought this Title VII action in 1974. They alleged that a variety of
employers' practices "were responsible for the racial stratification of
the work force ... "I' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the plaintiffs made "a prima facie case of disparate impact ...
solely on respondents' statistics showing a high percentage of non-
white workers in the cannery jobs and a low percentage of such
workers in the non-cannery positions. '3 2
The facts of the case are fairly simple. The petitioners "operate
salmon canneries in remote and widely separated areas of Alaska.""
The canneries operate only during the salmon runs in the summer
months. "Cannery jobs" are unskilled positions on cannery lines,
filled by non-whites, Filipinos, and Alaskan natives who reside near
the canneries. The Filipinos are hired through a hiring hall agreement
21 Id. at 1806.
29 Id. at 1792.
30 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
" Id. at 2120.
32 Id. at 2121.
I d. at 2119.
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with a union local. The "non-cannery" jobs are filled predominantly
by whites "who are hired during the winter months from the com-
panies' offices in Washington and Oregon." 3 4 The non-cannery jobs
are better paid than cannery jobs, and include such jobs as account-
ants, electricians, and doctors." The Court points out that "com-
paring the number of non-whites occupying these jobs to the number
of non-whites filling cannery workers positions is nonsensical. "36
The Court continued:
Such a result cannot be squared with our cases or with the goals
behind the statute. The Court of Appeals' theory, at the very least,
would mean that any employer who had a segment of his work
force that was-for some reason-racially imbalanced, could be
haled into court and forced to engage in the expensive and time-
consuming task of defending the "business necessity" of the methods
used to select the other members of his work force. The only
practicable option for many employers will be to adopt racial quotas,
insuring that no portion of his work force deviates in racial com-
position from the other portions thereof; this is a result that Congress
expressly rejected in drafting Title VII.3
The Court held that " 'the proper comparison (is) between the racial
composition of (the at-issue jobs) and the racial composition of the
qualified ... population in the relevant labor market.' "38
Since the statistical disparity was not sufficient to make a prima
facie case, the question remained whether the disparity was caused
by specific challenged employment practices, and whether such prac-
tices have been justified by business considerations. The burden of
persuasion again became the central issue in the opinion. The plaintiff
must identify specific employment practices challenged, and must
demonstrate that the application of such practices has a significantly
disparate impact on the employment opportunities of whites and non-
whites.39 The rest of the opinion deserves to be quoted in its totality;
the case citations will provide the European reader with important
sources of our present day law of employment discrimination.
34 Id.
31 Id. at 2122.
36 Id.
37 Id.
I1 d. at 2121, quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977).
39 Id. at 2124-25.
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If, on remand, respondents meet the proof burdens outlined above,
and establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect
to any of petitioners' employment practices, the case will shift to
any business justification petitioners offer for their use of these
practices. This phase of the disparate-impact case contains two
components: first, a consideration of the justifications an employer
offers for his use of these practices; and second, the availability of
alternate practices to achieve the same business ends, with less racial
impact. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S., at
425, 95 S. Ct., at 2375. We consider these two components in turn.
(1)
Though we have phrased the query differently in different cases,
it is generally well-established that at the justification stage of such
a disparate impact case, the dispositive issue is whether a challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals
of the employer. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
Co., 487 U.S., at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2777; New York Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S., at 587, n.31, 99 S. Ct. at 1366,
n.31; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S., at 432, 91 S. Ct., at
854. The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the
employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice. A
mere insubstantial justification in this regard will not suffice, because
such a low standard of review would permit discrimination to be
practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment
practices. At the same time, though, there is no requirement that
the challenged practice be "essential" or "indispensable" to the
employer's business for it to pass muster: this degree of scrutiny
would be almost impossible for most employers to meet, and would
result in a host of evils we have identified above. See supra, at
2122.
In this phase, the employer carries the burden of producing ev-
idence of a business justification for his employment practice. The
burden of persuasion, however, remains with the disparate-impact
plaintiff. To the extent that the Ninth Circuit held otherwise in its
en banc decision in this case, see 810 F.2d, at 1485-1486, or in the
panel's decision on remand, see 827 F.2d, at 445, 447-suggesting
that the persuasion burden should shift to the petitioners once the
respondents established a prima facie case of disparate impact-its
decisions were erroneous. "[T]he ultimate burden of proving that
discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific
employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times." Watson,
supra 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct., at 2790 (O'Connor, J.) (emphasis
added). This rule conforms with the usual method for allocating
persuasion and production burdens in the federal courts, see Fed.
Rule Evid. 301, and more specifically, it conforms to the rule in
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disparate-treatment cases that the plaintiff bears the burden of dis-
proving an employer's assertion that the adverse employment action
or practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral consideration.
See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256-258, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1095-1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). We
acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read as
suggesting otherwise. See Watson, supra, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S.
Ct., at 2777 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But to the extent that those
cases speak of an employer's "burden of proof" with respect to a
legitimate business justification defense, see, e.g., Dothard v. Raw-
linson, 433 U.S. 321, 329, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2726, 53 L.E.2d 786
(1971), they should have been understood to mean an employer's
production-but not persuasion-burden. Cf., e.g., NLRB v. Trans-
portation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404, n.7, 103 S. Ct.
2469, 2475, n.7, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983). The persuasion burden here
must remain with the plaintiff, for it is he who must prove that it
was "because of such individual's race, color," etc., that he was
denied a desired employment opportunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a).
(2)
Finally, if on remand the case reaches this point, and respondents
cannot persuade the trier of fact on the question of petitioners'
business necessity defense, respondents may still be able to prevail.
To do so, respondents will have to persuade the fact finder that
"other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate [hiring]
interest[s];" by so demonstrating, respondents would prove that
"[petitioners were] using [their] tests merely as a 'pretext' for dis-
crimination." Albermarle Paper Co., supra, 422 U.S., at 425, 95
S. Ct., at 2375; see also Watson, 487 U.S., at -, 108 S. Ct., at
2779 (O'Connor, J.); Id., at -, 108 S. Ct., at 2781 (Blackmun,
J.). If respondents, having established a prima facie case, come
forward with alternatives to petitioners' hiring practices that reduce
the racially-disparate impact of practices currently being used, and
petitioners refuse to adopt these alternatives, such a refusal would
belie a claim by petitioners that their incumbent practices are being
employed for nondiscriminatory reasons.
Of course, any alternative practice which respondents offer up in
this respect must be equally effective as petitioners' chosen hiring
procedures in achieving petitioners' legitimate employment goals.
Moreover, "[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed
alternative selection devices are relevant in determining wither they
would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving
the employer's legitimate business goals." Watson, supra, at __,
108 S. Ct., at 2790 (O'Connor, J.). "Courts are generally less
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competent than employers to restructure business practices," Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578, 98 S. Ct. 2943,
2950, 57 L.E.2d 957 (1978); consequently, the judiciary should
proceed with care before mandating that an employer must adopt
a plaintiff's alternate selection or hiring practice in response to a
Title VII suit. 4°
A somewhat angry dissent of Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, begins as follows:
Fully 18 years ago, this Court unanimously held that Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment practices that
have discriminatory effects as well as those that are intended to
discriminate. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct.
849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Federal courts and agencies consistently
have enforced that interpretation, thus promoting our national goal
of eliminating barriers that define economic opportunity not by
aptitude and ability but by race, color, national origin, and other
traits that are easily identified but utterly irrelevant to one's qual-
ification for a particular job. Regrettably, the Court retreats from
these efforts in its review of an interlocutory judgment respecting
the "peculiar facts" of this lawsuit. Turning a blind eye to the
meaning and purpose of Title VII, the majority's opinion perfunc-
torily rejects a longstanding rule of law and underestimates the
probative value of evidence of a racially stratified work force. I
cannot join this latest sojourn into judicial activisim. 4'
Admittedly, things are not as bad as Justice Stevens would make
us believe. Yet, I must admit, I would not like to be an attorney
representing a client on a contingency fee basis in a disparate impact
case unless the facts (and inferences) would come close to evidence
establishing a single motive case.
In Martin v. Wilks42 decided on June 12, 1989, the court, in the
opinion of the Chief Justice joined by Justices White, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy, held that those not designated or made parties
to a litigation resulting in consent decrees are not precluded from
challenging employment decisions made in compliance with such de-
crees. The issue was viewed as concerning the ordinary application
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At issue was a challenge
by white fire fighters to consent decrees with included goals for the
- Id. at 2125-27.
4 Id. at 2127-28.
42 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
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hiring and promotion of black fire fighters in the City of Birmingham,
Alabama.
It can be said that this case will now occupy a footnote in Conflict
of Laws books, in chapters on judgments.
In Lorance v. A T&T Technologies,43 yet another case decided on
June 12, 1989, plaintiffs, three women, attacked a contractual mod-
ification on seniority of a tester classification on the ground of
intentional discrimination based on sex. At issue was when the period
of limitations under Section 703(h) of Title VII 4 begins to run. The
Court concluded, "Because the claimed invalidity of the facially
nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied tester seniority system is
wholly dependent on alleged illegality of signing the underlying agree-
ment it is the date of that signing which governs the limitations
period. "141
The factual problem in the case was that the plaintiffs had been
demoted, feeling the effects of the contract, long after it was signed.
As a practical matter, few union members are fully conversant with
provisions of labor agreements.
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Blackmun, pointed to "the harsh reality of today's deci-
sion, '" which he deemed to be "glaringly at odds with the purposes
of Title VII." ' 47
There are various ways to view these cases. In the United States,
it is the conventional wisdom to approach civil rights cases with one
dominant criterion in mind: did the Court expand or contract the
civil rights in question-employment rights of "minorities" and hence
civil rights. Contraction of civil rights by the Supreme Court is deemed
to be historically impermissible.
As was already suggested, the decisions are couched in abstract,
technical terms-shift of the burden of persuasion, burden of per-
suasion versus burden of production of evidence, etc.-and in terms
of conformity or non-conformity with precedents. At the same time,
it is palpably obvious that the philosophical shift, if any, which these
decisions represent involves a degree of recognition of "rights" of
those who are not in a position identical to that of plaintiffs, as
109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
41 109 S. Ct., at 2268.
,6 Id. at 2270.
4 Id.
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opposed to exclusive preoccupation with plaintiffs and social change.
For instance, an emphasis on legitimate business reasons of defen-
dants-employers, a factual evaluation of the particular reason in a
particular case, represents a recognition of some freedom of the
employer. Treating consent decrees, i.e. settlements, under Title VII
like any other judgments represents a recognition of rights or op-
portunities of those (non-minorities) who may arrive on the scene
without participating in the settlement negotiations. Enforcement of
seniority rules under labor agreements represents equality of treatment
of all employees.
The balancing of rights in individual cases from a conceptual and
philosophical standpoint is often quite easy. For instance, knowing
that qualified and highly skilled non-white employees such as doctors,
nurses, boat captains, etc. are in relatively short supply in the United
States, and subject to competition among employers for affirmative
action reasons even in choice locations in the United States, one must
ask how Wards Cove is supposed to get such skilled non-whites to
remote locations in Alaska for seasonal work and still remain in
business? Is it not obvious that any highly skilled employee has to
be lured to remote regions of Alaska by benefits which the unskilled
laborer does not, and cannot economically command?
Obviously, a partnership should be able to demand that partners
be pleasant and civil people. Of course, when a partnership is akin
to a "factory" of accountants and when sexual stereotyping becomes
palpably obvious, the approach of Justice O'Connor is almost dictated
by the facts of the case, and is a rational solution to such facts as
those in Hopkins.41
The problem is that without social engineering the term "sexual
stereotyping" would be without legal significance, and no incentive
would exist to overcome prejudice and to create a single entity-a
person-for purposes of employment decisions.
Social engineering, remedies to overcome past discrimination as it
is called by the American courts (the principal agents of social en-
gineering in the United States), is like shock treatment. The goal
must be the state of society in which there are only persons, and no
minorities, and in which persons are treated as individuals rather
than as parts of a "collective." At some point, the shock treatment
must begin to give way to individual rights. The notions of fairness
- 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
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of the American people will influence the outcome of the competition
of ideas between the current majority of the Supreme Court and the
liberal interest groups in the area of employment rights.
In my judgment, there is an argument for paying greater attention
to facts in individual employment discrimination cases: recognized
minorities, such as blacks, Hispanics, other non-whites, women, hand-
icapped persons, religious groups, and those who aspire to achieve
the legal status of a "minority," such as homosexuals, are becoming
more and more diverse with respect to their status (as groups) in the
American society. At the same time, there is an increasing diversity
within each group. For instance, being a woman is less of a dominant
characteristic for employment purposes today than it was in the 1960s.
Handicapped persons have access to buildings which they did not
have in the 1960s, etc. These advances are, of course, the beneficial
and intended result of the shock treatment by social engineering in
the civil rights area. All this, however, requires that the emphasis on
group rights, as opposed to individual rights, does not remain static.
In conclusion, as mentioned above, I believe that the 1989 Supreme
Court decisions in the Title VII area signal a greater attention to the
facts of discrimination cases by American courts.
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